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Commensal cuckoo: secure group partitioning for large-scale services

Published:16 February 2012Publication History
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Abstract

We present commensal cuckoo,* a secure group partitioning scheme for large-scale systems that maintains the correctness of many small groups, despite a Byzantine adversary that controls a constant (global) fraction of all nodes. In particular, the adversary is allowed to repeatedly rejoin faulty nodes to the system in an arbitrary adaptive manner, e.g., to collocate them in the same group. Commensal cuckoo addresses serious practical limitations of the state-ofthe- art scheme, the cuckoo rule of Awerbuch and Scheideler, tolerating 32x--41x more faulty nodes with groups as small as 64 nodes (as compared to the hundreds required by the cuckoo rule). Secure group partitioning is a key component of highly-scalable, reliable systems such as Byzantine faulttolerant distributed hash tables (DHTs).

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
    ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review  Volume 46, Issue 1
    January 2012
    99 pages
    ISSN:0163-5980
    DOI:10.1145/2146382
    Issue’s Table of Contents

    Copyright © 2012 Authors

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 16 February 2012

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