Quanyan Zhu
ABSTRACT
The migration of many current critical infrastructures, such as power grids and transportations systems, into open public networks has posed many challenges in control systems. Modern control systems face uncertainties not only from the physical world but also from the cyber space. In this paper, we propose a hybrid game-theoretic approach to investigate the coupling between cyber security policy and robust control design. We study in detail the case of cascading failures in industrial control systems and provide a set of coupled optimality criteria in the linear-quadratic case. This approach can be further extended to more general cases of parallel cascading failures.
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Index Terms
- A dynamic game-theoretic approach to resilient control system design for cascading failures
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