Preston McAfee
Abstract
Puzzle Editor's Note: This is the winning solution to Baffling Raffling from issue 10.1. The mechanism described there is sometimes known as a Chinese Auction. It is also equivalent, as McAfee points out, to a special case of a Cournot problem. An alternative formulation is: I decide a bid x, pay it in full, and then win the good with probability x/X where X is the sum of all the bids. Generalizing the question in the original puzzle, this solves the game for an arbitrary vector of common-knowledge valuations, i.e., the complete-information case with n agents.
Recommendations
Solution to Exchanges 8.2 puzzle: a Dutch Dutch auction clock auction
This is a solution to the editor's puzzle from issue 8.2 of SIGecom Exchanges. The puzzle is about finding a Bayesian equilibrium for a Dutch auction which can end according to a stochastic price schedule. The full puzzle [Conitzer 2009] can be found ...
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systemsThe VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechanism: the problem of revenue guarantees, and that of collusion. The ...
Auction mechanisms for demand-side intermediaries in online advertising exchanges
AAMAS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systemsMotivated by the online advertising exchange marketplace where demand-side intermediaries conduct local upstream auctions and participate in the exchanges' real-time auctions, we study the revenue and efficiency effects of three different auction ...
Comments