Qin Li
ABSTRACT
Electronic marketplaces are not always easily regulated using traditional legal systems. As a result, suitable dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms for electronic marketplaces are of interest to design. In this paper, we design a multiagent-based e-marketplace where participants represented by autonomous software agents may be egocentric, strategic and even malicious. Our marketplace focuses on trading arbitrable and replicatable services, such as computational resources and data storage, over the Internet. We propose a novel dispute prevention and resolution mechanism that is theoretically proven to be able to induce good conduct for marketplace participants. Our marketplace also features cost-effectiveness, robustness and budget balance.
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Index Terms
- Design of a multiagent-based e-marketplace to secure service trading on the internet
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