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Analysis of generalised tit-for-tat strategies in evolutionary spatial n-player prisoner dilemmas: mr.

Published: 06 July 2013 Publication History

Abstract

This work explores the evolution of a population of generalised tit-for-tat (TFT) strategies playing an N-player prisoner's dilemma on a regular lattice. We show that the generalised TFT can be robust to invasion by defectors in most cases. However, interestingly, the TFT strategies which are highly tolerant perform worse than totally cooperative strategies. Furthermore, although, the TFT strategies cannot guarantee the promotion of cooperation, the less tolerant TFT strategies obtain a stable and higher level of cooperation against defectors and populations containing both defectors and cooperators.

References

[1]
R. Axelrod. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Genetic algorithms and simulated annealing, pages 32--41, 1987.
[2]
R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton. The Evolution of Cooperation. 1981.
[3]
R. Boyd and P. Richerson. The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 132(3):337--356, June 1988.
[4]
M. A. Nowak and R. M. May. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature, 359:826, 1992.

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  1. Analysis of generalised tit-for-tat strategies in evolutionary spatial n-player prisoner dilemmas: mr.

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      GECCO '13 Companion: Proceedings of the 15th annual conference companion on Genetic and evolutionary computation
      July 2013
      1798 pages
      ISBN:9781450319645
      DOI:10.1145/2464576
      • Editor:
      • Christian Blum,
      • General Chair:
      • Enrique Alba
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      Published: 06 July 2013

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      Author Tags

      1. cooperation
      2. evolutionary games
      3. n-player prisoner's dilemma
      4. spatial topology

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      GECCO '13
      Sponsor:
      GECCO '13: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference
      July 6 - 10, 2013
      Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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      Overall Acceptance Rate 1,669 of 4,410 submissions, 38%

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