research-article

Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty

Authors:

Georgios Piliouras,

Evdokia Nikolova,

Jeff S. ShammaAuthors Info & Claims

EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 715 - 732

https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482578

Published: 16 June 2013 Publication History

Abstract

In algorithmic game theory, the price of anarchy framework studies efficiency loss in decentralized environments. In optimization and decision theory, the price of robustness framework explores the tradeoffs between optimality and robustness in the case of single agent decision making under uncertainty. We establish a connection between the two that provides a novel analytic framework for proving tight performance guarantees for distributed systems in uncertain environments. We present applications of this framework to novel variants of atomic congestion games with uncertain costs, for which we provide tight performance bounds under a wide range of risk attitudes. Our results establish that the individual's attitude towards uncertainty has a critical effect on system performance and should therefore be a subject of close and systematic investigation.

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Cited By

Ferguson BBrown PMarden J(2023)Value of Information in Incentive Design: A Case Study in Simple Congestion NetworksIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2023.330587210:6(3077-3088)Online publication date: Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2023.3305872
Fotakis DKalimeris DLianeas T(2019)Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse PlayersTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-019-09946-8Online publication date: 10-Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09946-8
Colini-Baldeschi RCominetti RScarsini M(2019)Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel NetworksTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-017-9834-163:1(90-113)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2019
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Index Terms

Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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cover image ACM Conferences

EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2013

924 pages

ISBN:9781450319621

DOI:10.1145/2492002

General Chair:
Michael Kearns
University of Pennsylvania., USA
,
Program Chairs:
Preston McAfee
Google, USA
,
Éva Tardos
Cornell University, USA

Copyright © 2013 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 16 June 2013

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EC '13: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 16 - 20, 2013

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Cited By

Ferguson BBrown PMarden J(2023)Value of Information in Incentive Design: A Case Study in Simple Congestion NetworksIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2023.330587210:6(3077-3088)Online publication date: Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2023.3305872
Fotakis DKalimeris DLianeas T(2019)Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse PlayersTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-019-09946-8Online publication date: 10-Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09946-8
Colini-Baldeschi RCominetti RScarsini M(2019)Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel NetworksTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-017-9834-163:1(90-113)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00224-017-9834-1
Chen XHu XWu X(2019)The Price of Anarchy for the Load Balancing Game with a Randomizing SchedulerCombinatorial Optimization and Applications10.1007/978-3-030-36412-0_9(107-118)Online publication date: 23-Nov-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36412-0_9
Cole RLianeas TNikolova E(2018)When does diversity of agent preferences improve outcomes in selfish routing?Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304441(173-179)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304441
Brown PMarden J(2017)The Robustness of Marginal-Cost Taxes in Affine Congestion GamesIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control10.1109/TAC.2016.261967462:8(3999-4004)Online publication date: Aug-2017
https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2016.2619674
(2017)Studies on Robust Social Influence Mechanisms: Incentives for Efficient Network Routing in Uncertain SettingsIEEE Control Systems10.1109/MCS.2016.262148237:1(98-115)Online publication date: Feb-2017
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Caragiannis IFanelli AGravin N(2017)Short Sequences of Improvement Moves Lead to Approximate Equilibria in Constraint Satisfaction GamesAlgorithmica10.1007/s00453-016-0143-x77:4(1143-1158)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2017
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Kleer PSchäfer G(2017)Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion GamesAlgorithms and Complexity10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_32(381-392)Online publication date: 14-Apr-2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_32
Lianeas TNikolova EStier-Moses N(2016)Asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk-averse selfish routingProceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3060621.3060669(338-344)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2016
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