research-article

Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games

Authors:

Joshua Letchford,

Liam MacDermed,

Vincent Conitzer,

Charles L. IsbellAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 11, Issue 2

Pages 36 - 40

https://doi.org/10.1145/2509002.2509011

Published: 01 December 2012 Publication History

Abstract

Significant recent progress has been made in both the computation of optimal strategies to commit to (Stackelberg strategies), and the computation of correlated equilibria of stochastic games. In this letter we discuss some recent results in the intersection of these two areas. We investigate how valuable commitment can be in stochastic games and give a brief summary of complexity results about computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.

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ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 11, No. 2, December 2012, Pages 36--40

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Cited By

Chen YDeng XLi Y(2025)Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form gamesGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008149(118-147)Online publication date: Jan-2025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008
Castiglioni MMarchesi AGatti NConiglio S(2019)Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games: What is Hard and What is EasyArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2019.103177(103177)Online publication date: Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103177
Gupta ASchewe SWojtczak D(2015)Making the Best of Limited Memory in Multi-Player Discounted Sum GamesElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.193.2193(16-30)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2015
https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.193.2
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence
      1. Multi-agent systems

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Published In

cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges

ACM SIGecom Exchanges Volume 11, Issue 2

December 2012

42 pages

EISSN:1551-9031

DOI:10.1145/2509002

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2012 Authors.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 December 2012

Published in SIGECOM Volume 11, Issue 2

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Cited By

Chen YDeng XLi Y(2025)Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form gamesGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008149(118-147)Online publication date: Jan-2025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008
Castiglioni MMarchesi AGatti NConiglio S(2019)Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games: What is Hard and What is EasyArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2019.103177(103177)Online publication date: Sep-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103177
Gupta ASchewe SWojtczak D(2015)Making the Best of Limited Memory in Multi-Player Discounted Sum GamesElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.193.2193(16-30)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2015
https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.193.2
Chang YErera AWhite C(2015)A leader–follower partially observed, multiobjective Markov gameAnnals of Operations Research10.1007/s10479-015-1935-0235:1(103-128)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2015
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1935-0
Bošanský BBrânzei SHansen KMiltersen PSørensen T(2015)Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential GamesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15(201-215)Online publication date: 30-Dec-2015
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15
Zhang CJiang AShort MBrantingham PTambe M(2014)Defending Against Opportunistic Criminals: New Game-Theoretic Frameworks and AlgorithmsDecision and Game Theory for Security10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_1(3-22)Online publication date: 2014
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_1

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