research-article

Generalized scoring rules: a framework that reconciles Borda and Condorcet

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Lirong XiaAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 12, Issue 1

Pages 42 - 48

https://doi.org/10.1145/2509013.2509020

Published: 01 June 2013 Publication History

Abstract

Generalized scoring rules [Xia and Conitzer 08] are a relatively new class of social choice mechanisms. In this paper, we survey developments in generalized scoring rules, showing that they provide a fruitful framework to obtain general results, and also reconcile the Borda approach and Condorcet approach via a new social choice axiom. We comment on some high-level ideas behind GSRs and their connection to Machine Learning, and point out some ongoing work and future directions.

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Cited By

Furxhi IMurphy FMullins MPoland C(2019)Machine Learning Prediction of Nanoparticle In Vitro Toxicity: A Comparative Study of Classifiers and Ensemble-Classifiers using the Copeland IndexToxicology Letters10.1016/j.toxlet.2019.05.016Online publication date: May-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.toxlet.2019.05.016
Brill MTalmon N(2018)Pairwise liquid democracyProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304436(137-143)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304436
Xia LRoughgarden TFeldman MSchwarz M(2015)Generalized Decision Scoring RulesProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2764468.2764518(661-678)Online publication date: 15-Jun-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2764468.2764518

Index Terms

Generalized scoring rules: a framework that reconciles Borda and Condorcet
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence
      1. Multi-agent systems

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Published In

cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges

ACM SIGecom Exchanges Volume 12, Issue 1

June 2013

56 pages

EISSN:1551-9031

DOI:10.1145/2509013

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2013 Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 June 2013

Published in SIGECOM Volume 12, Issue 1

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Cited By

Furxhi IMurphy FMullins MPoland C(2019)Machine Learning Prediction of Nanoparticle In Vitro Toxicity: A Comparative Study of Classifiers and Ensemble-Classifiers using the Copeland IndexToxicology Letters10.1016/j.toxlet.2019.05.016Online publication date: May-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.toxlet.2019.05.016
Brill MTalmon N(2018)Pairwise liquid democracyProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304436(137-143)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304436
Xia LRoughgarden TFeldman MSchwarz M(2015)Generalized Decision Scoring RulesProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2764468.2764518(661-678)Online publication date: 15-Jun-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2764468.2764518

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