abstract

Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation

Authors:

Paul Milgrom,

Ilya SegalAuthors Info & Claims

EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

Pages 185 - 186

https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602834

Published: 01 June 2014 Publication History

Get Access

Abstract

No abstract available.

Cited By

View all

Martin CSandholm TElkind E(2023)Finding mixed-strategy equilibria of continuous-action games without gradients using randomized policy networksProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/317(2844-2852)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/317
Feldman MGkatzelis VGravin NSchoepflin DPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Bayesian and Randomized Clock AuctionsProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538247(820-845)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538247
Tafreshian AMasoud N(2022)A truthful subsidy scheme for a peer-to-peer ridesharing market with incomplete informationTransportation Research Part B: Methodological10.1016/j.trb.2022.05.010162(130-161)Online publication date: Aug-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2022.05.010
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

Recommendations

The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-parameter mechanism design problems whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy algorithm. Milgrom and Segal [2014] recently introduced these auctions and proved ...
The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions

Deferred-acceptance auctions are mechanisms whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy algorithm. Milgrom and Segal recently introduced these auctions and proved that they satisfy remarkable incentive guarantees: in ...
Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and ...

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

June 2014

1028 pages

ISBN:9781450325653

DOI:10.1145/2600057

General Chair:
Moshe Babaioff
Microsoft Research
,
Program Chairs:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
David Easley
Cornell University

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 June 2014

Check for updates

Author Tags

Qualifiers

Abstract

Conference

EC '14

Sponsor:

SIGecom

EC '14: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 8 - 12, 2014

California, Palo Alto, USA

Acceptance Rates

EC '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 80 of 290 submissions, 28%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

Upcoming Conference

EC '25

Sponsor:
sigecom

The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 7 - 11, 2025

Stanford , CA , USA

Contributors

Other Metrics

View Article Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

42
Total Citations
View Citations
336
Total Downloads

Downloads (Last 12 months)22
Downloads (Last 6 weeks)2

Reflects downloads up to 07 Mar 2025

Other Metrics

View Author Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all

Martin CSandholm TElkind E(2023)Finding mixed-strategy equilibria of continuous-action games without gradients using randomized policy networksProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/317(2844-2852)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/317
Feldman MGkatzelis VGravin NSchoepflin DPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Bayesian and Randomized Clock AuctionsProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538247(820-845)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538247
Tafreshian AMasoud N(2022)A truthful subsidy scheme for a peer-to-peer ridesharing market with incomplete informationTransportation Research Part B: Methodological10.1016/j.trb.2022.05.010162(130-161)Online publication date: Aug-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2022.05.010
Malik KMishra D(2020)Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearityJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2020.105128(105128)Online publication date: Oct-2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105128
Loertscher SWasser C(2019)Optimal structure and dissolution of partnershipsTheoretical Economics10.3982/TE260814:3(1063-1114)Online publication date: 2019
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2608
Ferraioli DMeier APenna PVentre C(2019)Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set SystemsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_13(171-185)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_13
Le P(2018)Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctionsTheoretical Economics10.3982/TE248913:2(831-868)Online publication date: May-2018
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2489
Agastya MBirulin O(2018)VALUE OF THE STATUS QUO AND EFFICIENT PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTIONInternational Economic Review10.1111/iere.1232859:4(2023-2042)Online publication date: 18-Jul-2018
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12328
Dütting PGkatzelis VRoughgarden T(2017)The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance AuctionsMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2016.083542:4(897-914)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/moor.2016.0835
Newman NFréchette ALeyton-Brown K(2017)Deep optimization for spectrum repackingCommunications of the ACM10.1145/310754861:1(97-104)Online publication date: 27-Dec-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3107548
Show More Cited By

View Options

Login options

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

Full Access

Get this Publication

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Abstract

Cited By

Index Terms

Recommendations

The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Comments

Information

Published In

Sponsors

Publisher

Publication History

Check for updates

Author Tags

Qualifiers

Conference

Acceptance Rates

Upcoming Conference

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

Login options

Full Access

View options

PDF

eReader

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media

Affiliations