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Stalk me if you can: the anatomy of sybil attacks in opportunistic networks

Published:07 September 2014Publication History

ABSTRACT

Opportunistic Networks are envisioned to complement infrastruc-ture-based communication in overloaded cellular settings, in remote areas, during and immediately after large scale disasters. On account of their highly distributed and dynamic nature, as well as of their dependence on the honest cooperation of nodes, Opportunistic Networks are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack, a node assumes multiple identities and attempts to form many links to the rest of the network, with the aim of gaining access to resources, influencing the network, circumventing detection of misbehavior ("spread the blame"), etc. Sybil attacks have been studied extensively in the context of distributed systems and online social networks. However, the Opportunistic Networking setting brings new challenges, specific to the network conditions: forming links may require significant resources from the attacker (e.g. time, speed, multiple devices, etc), and each link is ephemeral. In this paper, we study the types and effectiveness of sybil attacks that are possible in Opportunistic Networks, under various resource constraints on the attacker. We evaluate each attack based on the influence the attacker can gain through it. We find that sybil attacks, even with relatively unconstrained resources, are much harder to implement in the Opportunistic Networking setting, due to the link establishment mechanisms using mobility. We believe this is a very important first step towards understanding and defending against sybil attacks in such networks.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      CHANTS '14: Proceedings of the 9th ACM MobiCom workshop on Challenged networks
      September 2014
      104 pages
      ISBN:9781450330718
      DOI:10.1145/2645672

      Copyright © 2014 ACM

      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      • Published: 7 September 2014

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      CHANTS '14 Paper Acceptance Rate15of37submissions,41%Overall Acceptance Rate61of159submissions,38%

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