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Security, cybercrime, and scale

Published:01 September 2014Publication History
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Abstract

Defense begins by identifying the targets likely to yield the greatest reward for an attacker's investment.

References

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Index Terms

  1. Security, cybercrime, and scale

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                Reviews

                De Wang

                This article analyzes the traditional threat model for cybersecurity and proposes a new model that considers scalability and financial motivation. In the new threat model, the author splits cybercrime into two categories: financial and non-financial. The financial category further divides into scalable and non-scalable. The author presents a formula for financially motivated attackers and concludes that “the average gain minus average cost of an attack must be positive.” The author points out, “when we ignore attacker constraints, we make things more difficult than they need to be for defenders.” Some potential attacks should be minimally addressed, since they will be threats that pose no gain for financially motivated attackers. Through an analysis of “the difficulties of profitably finding targets and monetizing them,” the author presents a new approach to analyzing potential cybercrimes. I recommend this article to researchers in the cybercrime area since it provides a potentially useful new threat model. If we adopt the new threat model, we will be able to save on costs by defending attacks at scale and also be able to fully understand the motivations of attackers. Online Computing Reviews Service

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                • Published in

                  cover image Communications of the ACM
                  Communications of the ACM  Volume 57, Issue 9
                  September 2014
                  94 pages
                  ISSN:0001-0782
                  EISSN:1557-7317
                  DOI:10.1145/2663191
                  • Editor:
                  • Moshe Y. Vardi
                  Issue’s Table of Contents

                  Copyright © 2014 ACM

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                  New York, NY, United States

                  Publication History

                  • Published: 1 September 2014

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