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Your Voice Assistant is Mine: How to Abuse Speakers to Steal Information and Control Your Phone

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Published:07 November 2014Publication History

ABSTRACT

Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These approaches obtain data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking permissions.

This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch permission bypassing attacks from a zero-permission Android application (VoicEmployer) through the phone speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack is to utilize an Android system built-in voice assistant module -- Google Voice Search. With Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer can bring Google Voice Search to foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like "call number 1234 5678") in the background. Google Voice Search can recognize this voice command and perform corresponding operations. With ingenious design, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote control without any permission. Moreover, we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app, which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even when the phone is securely locked with password.

A prototype of VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of GVS-Attack. In theory, nearly all Android (4.1+) devices equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack. This study may inspire application developers and researchers to rethink that zero permission doesn't mean safety and the speaker can be treated as a new attack surface.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        SPSM '14: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones & Mobile Devices
        November 2014
        118 pages
        ISBN:9781450331555
        DOI:10.1145/2666620

        Copyright © 2014 ACM

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        • Published: 7 November 2014

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        SPSM '14 Paper Acceptance Rate11of29submissions,38%Overall Acceptance Rate46of139submissions,33%

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