N. Teja Chiluvuri
ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical control systems are networked through traditional IT infrastructures and prone to malware that can dangerously disrupt physical processes. We propose a trustworthy autonomic interface guardian architecture (TAIGA) that physically isolates trusted defense mechanisms from the untrusted production controller while acting as an intermediary for all controller I/O. Trusted modules adhere to stringent trust requirements that prevent malicious intrusion. In contrast to existing security measures, TAIGA observes the physical process instead of the cyber components by directly monitoring both supervisory and plant behavior. Harnessing heterogeneous computing on a Xilinx Zynq-7000 configurable SoC, TAIGA is applied to ensure stability of a rotary inverted pendulum by preemptively detecting malicious plant behavior and switching to a trusted high-assurance backup controller. Simulated attacks on the system show an increased resilience to reconfiguration and network integrity attacks, thereby strengthening the overall security of the system.
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Index Terms
- Using Heterogeneous Computing to Implement a Trust Isolated Architecture for Cyber-Physical Control Systems
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