skip to main content
10.1145/2764468.2764470acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesecConference Proceedingsconference-collections
abstract

Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended Abstract

Published: 15 June 2015 Publication History

Abstract

We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility [Shapley and Shubik 1972]. In our model agents follow an aspiration adjustment process based on their experienced payoffs (see [Sauermann and Selten 1962], [Nax and Pradelski 2014]). At random points in time firms and workers match, break up, and re-match in the search for better opportunities. Agents have aspiration levels that they adjust based on their experienced payoffs. When matched an agent occasionally tries to succeed with a higher bid than his current aspiration level. When single an agent lowers his aspiration level in the hope of attracting a partner. In particular agents have no knowledge about other players' payoffs or actions and they update their behavior in a myopic fashion. Behavior fluctuates according to a random variable that reflects current market sentiment: sometimes the firms exhibit greater price stickiness than the workers, and at other times the reverse holds. We show that this stochastic learning process converges in polynomial time to the core. While convergence to the core is known for some types of decentralized dynamics this paper is the first to prove {polynomial time convergence}, a crucial feature from an explanatory and market design standpoint. We also show that without market sentiment the dynamic exhibits exponential time convergence. The proof relies on novel results for random walks on graphs, and more generally suggests a fruitful connection between the theory of random walks and matching theory.

References

[1]
Nax, H. H. and Pradelski, B. S. R. 2014. Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
[2]
Sauermann, H. and Selten, R. 1962. Anspruchsanpassungstheorie der Unternehmung. Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 118, 577--597.
[3]
Shapley, L. S. and Shubik, M. 1972. The assignment game 1: The core. International Journal of Game Theory 1, 1, 111--130.

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Conventions and social choice in large gamesSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4775575Online publication date: 2024
  • (2024)A Blockchain Based Matching Game for Content Sharing in Content-Centric Vehicle-to-Grid Network ScenariosIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems10.1109/TITS.2023.332282625:5(4032-4048)Online publication date: May-2024
  • (2023)Blind matching algorithm based proxy distribution against internet censorshipIET Communications10.1049/cmu2.1258917:7(863-877)Online publication date: 27-Feb-2023
  • Show More Cited By

Index Terms

  1. Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended Abstract

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '15: Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    June 2015
    852 pages
    ISBN:9781450334105
    DOI:10.1145/2764468
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

    Sponsors

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 15 June 2015

    Check for updates

    Author Tags

    1. assignment games
    2. convergence time
    3. core
    4. evolutionary game theory
    5. matching markets
    6. random walks

    Qualifiers

    • Abstract

    Funding Sources

    Conference

    EC '15
    Sponsor:
    EC '15: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    June 15 - 19, 2015
    Oregon, Portland, USA

    Acceptance Rates

    EC '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 72 of 220 submissions, 33%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

    Upcoming Conference

    EC '25
    The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    July 7 - 11, 2025
    Stanford , CA , USA

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)2
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
    Reflects downloads up to 20 Jan 2025

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2024)Conventions and social choice in large gamesSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4775575Online publication date: 2024
    • (2024)A Blockchain Based Matching Game for Content Sharing in Content-Centric Vehicle-to-Grid Network ScenariosIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems10.1109/TITS.2023.332282625:5(4032-4048)Online publication date: May-2024
    • (2023)Blind matching algorithm based proxy distribution against internet censorshipIET Communications10.1049/cmu2.1258917:7(863-877)Online publication date: 27-Feb-2023
    • (2021)Win–Win-Driven D2D Content SharingIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2020.30410828:9(7346-7359)Online publication date: 1-May-2021
    • (2019)Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economiesInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-019-00694-0Online publication date: 12-Aug-2019
    • (2018)Evolutionary Game Theory: A RenaissanceGames10.3390/g90200319:2(31)Online publication date: 24-May-2018
    • (2018)Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the CoreGerman Economic Review10.1111/geer.12160Online publication date: 14-Mar-2018
    • (2017)Fast Convergence in the Double Oral AuctionACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/30843585:4(1-18)Online publication date: 22-Dec-2017
    • (2017)BLMAIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2017.265909835:2(302-316)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2017
    • (2016)Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population GamesEconometrica10.3982/ECTA1074084:2(627-676)Online publication date: 21-Mar-2016
    • Show More Cited By

    View Options

    Login options

    View options

    PDF

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    Media

    Figures

    Other

    Tables

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media