Shahar Dobzinski
Abstract
A long-standing open question in algorithmic mechanism design is whether there exist computationally efficient truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, with performance guarantees close to those possible without considerations of truthfulness. In this article, we answer this question negatively: the requirement of truthfulness can impact dramatically the ability of a mechanism to achieve a good approximation ratio for combinatorial auctions.
More precisely, we show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that approximates optimal social welfare within a factor of m1/2−ϵ must use exponentially many value queries, where m is the number of items. Furthermore, we show that there exists a class of succinctly represented submodular valuation functions, for which the existence of a universally truthful polynomial-time mechanism that provides an m1/2−ϵ-approximation would imply NP = RP. In contrast, ignoring truthfulness, there exist constant-factor approximation algorithms for this problem, and ignoring computational efficiency, the VCG mechanism is truthful and provides optimal social welfare. These are the first hardness results for truthful polynomial-time mechanisms for any type of combinatorial auctions, even for deterministic mechanisms.
Our approach is based on a novel direct hardness technique that completely skips the notoriously hard step of characterizing truthful mechanisms. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility results in algorithmic mechanism design so far.
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Index Terms
- Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
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