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A Study on Botnets Utilizing DNS

Published:29 September 2015Publication History

ABSTRACT

Botnets represent a major and formidable threat in modern computing, and security researchers are engaged in constant and escalating battle with the writers of such malware to detect and mitigate it. Current advanced malware behaviors include encryption of communications between the botmaster and the bot machines as well as various strategies for resilience and obfuscation. These techniques have taken full advantage of the infrastructure in place to support the increased connectivity between computers around the world. This includes updates and upgrades to DNS that have been leveraged to meet its increased utilization. In this paper, we analyze the current uses of DNS by botnet malware writers and operators and examine possible clues that network administrators and savvy computer users can utilize to identify and or mitigate the threat.

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            cover image ACM Conferences
            RIIT '15: Proceedings of the 4th Annual ACM Conference on Research in Information Technology
            September 2015
            72 pages
            ISBN:9781450338363
            DOI:10.1145/2808062

            Copyright © 2015 ACM

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            Publication History

            • Published: 29 September 2015

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            RIIT '15 Paper Acceptance Rate10of22submissions,45%Overall Acceptance Rate51of116submissions,44%

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