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Encore: Lightweight Measurement of Web Censorship with Cross-Origin Requests

Published:17 August 2015Publication History
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Abstract

Despite the pervasiveness of Internet censorship, we have scant data on its extent, mechanisms, and evolution. Measuring censorship is challenging: it requires continual measurement of reachability to many target sites from diverse vantage points. Amassing suitable vantage points for longitudinal measurement is difficult; existing systems have achieved only small, short-lived deployments. We observe, however, that most Internet users access content via Web browsers, and the very nature of Web site design allows browsers to make requests to domains with different origins than the main Web page. We present Encore, a system that harnesses cross-origin requests to measure Web filtering from a diverse set of vantage points without requiring users to install custom software, enabling longitudinal measurements from many vantage points. We explain how Encore induces Web clients to perform cross-origin requests that measure Web filtering, design a distributed platform for scheduling and collecting these measurements, show the feasibility of a global-scale deployment with a pilot study and an analysis of potentially censored Web content, identify several cases of filtering in six months of measurements, and discuss ethical concerns that would arise with widespread deployment.

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        • Published in

          cover image ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
          ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review  Volume 45, Issue 4
          SIGCOMM'15
          October 2015
          659 pages
          ISSN:0146-4833
          DOI:10.1145/2829988
          Issue’s Table of Contents
          • cover image ACM Conferences
            SIGCOMM '15: Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Special Interest Group on Data Communication
            August 2015
            684 pages
            ISBN:9781450335423
            DOI:10.1145/2785956

          Copyright © 2015 ACM

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          • Published: 17 August 2015

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