Avichai Cohen
Yossi Gilad
ABSTRACT
Extensive standardization and R&D efforts are dedicated to establishing secure interdomain routing. These efforts focus on two mechanisms: origin authentication with RPKI, and path validation with BGPsec. However, while RPKI is finally gaining traction, the adoption of BGPsec seems not even on the horizon due to inherent, possibly insurmountable, obstacles, including the need to replace today's routing infrastructure, the overhead of online cryptography, and meagre benefits in partial deployment. Consequently, secure interdomain routing remains a distant dream. We propose an easily deployable, modest extension to RPKI, called ``path-end validation'', which does not entail replacing/upgrading today's BGP routers nor online cryptographic operations. We show, through rigorous security analyses and extensive simulations on empirically-derived datasets, that path-end validation yields significant security benefits even in very limited partial adoption. We present an open-source, readily deployable prototype implementation of path-end validation.
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Index Terms
- Jumpstarting BGP Security with Path-End Validation
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