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Mechanism Design with Selective Verification

Published: 21 July 2016 Publication History

Abstract

We introduce a general approach based on selective verification and obtain approximate mechanisms without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of Utilitarian Voting. Having a good allocation in mind, a mechanism with verification selects few critical agents and detects, using a verification oracle, whether they have reported truthfully. If yes, the mechanism produces the desired allocation. Otherwise, the mechanism ignores any misreports and proceeds recursively with the remaining agents. We obtain randomized truthful (or almost truthful) mechanisms without money that verify only O(ln m/eps) agents, where m is the number of outcomes, independently of the total number of agents, and are (1-eps)-approximate for the social welfare. We also show that any truthful mechanism with a constant approximation ratio needs to verify Omega(log m) agents. A remarkable property of our mechanisms is immunity (to agent misreports), namely that their outcome depends only on the reports of the truthful agents.

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Cited By

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  • (2022)Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable InstancesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6(95-112)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
  • (2018)Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanismsProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304450(240-246)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
  • (2018)Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof MechanismsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3238027(1930-1932)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 2016
874 pages
ISBN:9781450339360
DOI:10.1145/2940716
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Publication History

Published: 21 July 2016

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Author Tags

  1. algorithmic mechanism design
  2. approximate mechanism design without money
  3. mechanisms with verification

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  • Research-article

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  • Greek Secretariat for Research and Technology
  • NSF
  • Simons Foundation

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EC '16
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EC '16: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 24 - 28, 2016
Maastricht, The Netherlands

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EC '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 80 of 242 submissions, 33%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2022)Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable InstancesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6(95-112)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
  • (2018)Probabilistic verification for obviously strategyproof mechanismsProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304450(240-246)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
  • (2018)Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof MechanismsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3238027(1930-1932)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
  • (2016)Efficient Money Burning in General DomainsTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-016-9720-259:4(619-640)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2016

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