research-article

On detecting delay anomalies introduced by hardware Trojans

Authors:

J. Plusquellic,

F. SaqibAuthors Info & Claims

2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)

Pages 1 - 7

https://doi.org/10.1145/2966986.2967061

Published: 07 November 2016 Publication History

Abstract

A hardware Trojan (HT) detection method is presented that is based on measuring and detecting small systematic changes in path delays introduced by capacitive loading effects or series inserted gates of HTs. The path delays are measured using a high resolution on-chip embedded test structure called a time-to-digital converter (TDC) that provides approx. 25 ps of timing resolution. A calibration method for the TDC as well as a chip-averaging technique are demonstrated to nearly eliminate chip-to-chip and within-die process variation effects on the measured path delays across chips. This approach significantly improves the correlation between Trojan-free chips and a simulation-based golden model. Path delay tests are applied to multiple copies of a 90nm custom ASIC chip having two copies of an AES macro. The AES macros are exact replicas except for the insertion of several additional gates in the second hardware copy, which are designed to model HTs. Simple statistical detection methods are used to isolate and detect systematic changes introduced by these additional gates. We present hardware results which demonstrate that our proposed chip-averaging and calibration techniques in combination with a single nominal simulation model can be used to detect small delay anomalies introduced by the inserted gates of hardware Trojans.

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Wei XZhang JLuo G(2024)Rethinking IC Layout Vulnerability: Simulation-Based Hardware Trojan Threat Assessment with High Fidelity2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00160(3789-3804)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
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On detecting delay anomalies introduced by hardware Trojans
1. Applied computing
2. Hardware

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cover image Guide Proceedings

2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)

Nov 2016

946 pages

Copyright © 2016.

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IEEE Press

Publication History

Published: 07 November 2016

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Cited By

Wei XZhang JLuo G(2024)Rethinking IC Layout Vulnerability: Simulation-Based Hardware Trojan Threat Assessment with High Fidelity2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00160(3789-3804)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00160
Hu XZhang YLi ZLi S(2024)CA4TJ: Correlational Analysis for Always-On Information-Leakage Hardware Trojan Detecting2024 IEEE International Test Conference in Asia (ITC-Asia)10.1109/ITC-Asia62534.2024.10661328(1-6)Online publication date: 18-Aug-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ITC-Asia62534.2024.10661328
Mondal AKalita DGhosh ARoy SSen B(2023)Toward the Generation of Test Vectors for the Detection of Hardware Trojan Targeting Effective Switching ActivityACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems10.1145/359749719:4(1-16)Online publication date: 19-May-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3597497
Gubbi KSaber Latibari BSrikanth ASheaves TBeheshti-Shirazi SPD SRafatirad SSasan AHomayoun HSalehi S(2023)Hardware Trojan Detection Using Machine Learning: A TutorialACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems10.1145/357982322:3(1-26)Online publication date: 18-Jan-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3579823
Tiwari SS R R(2023)An Efficient Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Side-Channel Analysis2023 IEEE 20th India Council International Conference (INDICON)10.1109/INDICON59947.2023.10440804(85-90)Online publication date: 14-Dec-2023
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Basu SGhoshal RKule M(2023)On Detection of Hardware Trojan in Memristive Nanocrossbar-Based CircuitsProceedings of International Conference on Frontiers in Computing and Systems10.1007/978-981-99-2680-0_28(319-329)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
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Mao JJiang XLiu DChen JHuang K(2022)A Hardware Trojan-Detection Technique Based on Suspicious Circuit Block PartitionElectronics10.3390/electronics1124413811:24(4138)Online publication date: 12-Dec-2022
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Mukherjee RRajendran SChakraborty R(2022)A comprehensive survey of physical and logic testing techniques for Hardware Trojan detection and preventionJournal of Cryptographic Engineering10.1007/s13389-022-00295-w12:4(495-522)Online publication date: 16-Jul-2022
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Ma HHe JLiu YKuai JLi HLiu LZhao Y(2021)On-Chip Trust Evaluation Utilizing TDC-Based Parameter-Adjustable Security PrimitiveIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2020.303534640:10(1985-1994)Online publication date: Oct-2021
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Mondal ABiswal RMahalat MRoy SSen B(2021)Hardware Trojan Free Netlist Identification: A Clustering ApproachJournal of Electronic Testing10.1007/s10836-021-05953-1Online publication date: 19-Jun-2021
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