Export Citations
2016 Proceeding- Conference Chairs:
- Mathias Payer,
- Stefan Mangard,
- General Chairs:
- Edgar Weippl,
- Stefan Katzenbeisser,
- Program Chairs:
- Alvaro Cárdenas,
- Rakesh B. Bobba
- Sponsor:
- sigsac
It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the Second ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy (CPS-SPC) in conjunction with the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) in Vienna, Austria.
Our increased dependency on cyber-physical systems (CPS) has amplified concerns of cyber attacks on these systems. These transformative attack methods require additional research into secure control systems and related architectures of CPS. The majority of the published literature addressing the security and privacy of CPS reflect a field still in its infancy; as such, the overall principles, models, and theories for securing CPS have not yet emerged. It is hoped that this workshop will provide a focal point for the research community to begin addressing the security and privacy of CPS in a comprehensive and multidisciplinary manner and, in tandem with other efforts, build a comprehensive research roadmap. As a workshop, we expect to attract papers that reflect ongoing work that are still "works in progress".
This year's workshop builds on the foundation laid last year to become one of the premier forums for presentation of interdisciplinary research results and experience reports at the interface of control theory, information security, embedded and real-time systems and human factors applied to CPS. The mission of the workshop is to create a community of researchers focusing on diverse aspects of CPS Security and Privacy, and to provide researchers and practitioners a premiere forum to share their perspectives with others interested in interdisciplinary approaches to solve the challenging security and privacy problems in CPS.
The workshop attracted 26 submissions from across 10 countries, and all papers were reviewed by at least three program committee members. 12 papers were accepted leading to a 46% acceptance rate.
Proceeding Downloads
Automatic Construction of Statechart-Based Anomaly Detection Models for Multi-Threaded SCADA via Spectral Analysis
Traffic of Industrial Control System (ICS) between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is highly periodic. However, it is sometimes multiplexed, due to multi-threaded scheduling.
In previous work we introduced a ...
Towards High-Interaction Virtual ICS Honeypots-in-a-Box
In this work, we address the problem of designing and implementing honeypots for Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Honeypots are vulnerable systems that are set up with the intent to be probed and compromised by attackers. Analysis of those attacks then ...
SENAMI: Selective Non-Invasive Active Monitoring for ICS Intrusion Detection
Current intrusion detection systems (IDS) for industrial control systems (ICS) mostly involve the retrofitting of conventional network IDSs, such as SNORT. Such an approach is prone to missing highly targeted and specific attacks against ICS. Where ICS-...
Secure Location Verification with a Mobile Receiver
We present a technique for performing secure location verification of position claims by measuring the time-difference of arrival (TDoA) between a fixed receiver node and a mobile one. The mobile node moves randomly in order to substantially increase ...
Risk Assessment for Cooperative Automated Driving
Global investment and recent advancements in vehicle automation are making autonomous and cooperative automated driving (AD) a reality. Not only will automated vehicles incorporate more electronics and connectivity than ever before, but also, notably, ...
Towards Safe and Secure Autonomous and Cooperative Vehicle Ecosystems
Semi-autonomous driver assists are already widely deployed and fully autonomous cars are progressively leaving the realm of laboratories. This evolution coexists with a progressive connectivity and cooperation, creating important safety and security ...
Evaluating Resilience of Gas Pipeline Systems Under Cyber-Physical Attacks: A Function-Based Methodology
In this research paper, we present a function-based methodology to evaluate the resilience of gas pipeline systems under two different cyber-physical attack scenarios. The first attack scenario is the pressure integrity attack on the natural gas high-...
A Case Study on Implementing False Data Injection Attacks Against Nonlinear State Estimation
Smart grid aims to improve control and monitoring routines to ensure reliable and efficient supply of electricity. The rapid advancements in information and communication technologies of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, however,...
Achieving ICS Resilience and Security through Granular Data Flow Management
Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) rely on enterprise to plant floor connectivity. Where the size, diversity, and therefore complexity of ICS increase, operational requirements, goals, and challenges defined by users across various sub-systems ...
HAMIDS: Hierarchical Monitoring Intrusion Detection System for Industrial Control Systems
In this paper, we propose a hierarchical monitoring intrusion detection system (HAMIDS) for industrial control systems (ICS). The HAMIDS framework detects the anomalies in both level 0 and level 1 of an industrial control plant. In addition, the ...
SoftGrid: A Software-based Smart Grid Testbed for Evaluating Substation Cybersecurity Solutions
Electrical substations are crucial for power grids. A number of international standards, such as IEC 60870 and 61850, have emerged to enable remote and automated control over substations. However, owing to insufficient security consideration in their ...
Exposing Transmitters in Mobile Multi-Agent Games
We study the trade-off between the benefits obtained by communication, vs. the risks due to exposure of the location of the transmitter. To study this problem, we introduce a game between two teams of mobile agents, the P-bots team and the E-bots team. ...
Index Terms
- Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy
Recommendations
Acceptance Rates
| Year | Submitted | Accepted | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| CPS-SPC '18 | 10 | 22 | 220% |
| CPS '17 | 10 | 8 | 80% |
| CPS-SPC '16 | 26 | 12 | 46% |
| CPS-SPC '15 | 20 | 11 | 55% |
| Overall | 66 | 53 | 80% |