Kopo M. Ramokapane
Awais Rashid
ABSTRACT
Inadvertent exposure of sensitive data is a major concern for potential cloud customers. Much focus has been on other data leakage vectors, such as side channel attacks, while issues of data disposal and assured deletion have not received enough attention to date. However, data that is not properly destroyed may lead to unintended disclosures, in turn, resulting in heavy financial penalties and reputational damage. In non-cloud contexts, issues of incomplete deletion are well understood. To the best of our knowledge, to date, there has been no systematic analysis of assured deletion challenges in public clouds.
In this paper, we aim to address this gap by analysing assured deletion requirements for the cloud, identifying cloud features that pose a threat to assured deletion, and describing various assured deletion challenges. Based on this discussion, we identify future challenges for research in this area and propose an initial assured deletion architecture for cloud settings. Altogether, our work offers a systematization of requirements and challenges of assured deletion in the cloud, and a well-founded reference point for future research in developing new solutions to assured deletion.
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Index Terms
- Assured Deletion in the Cloud: Requirements, Challenges and Future Directions
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