ABSTRACT
In this paper, we utilize a multi-objective genetic algorithm (GA) to investigate the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma problem with a population of players that don't have uniform objectives. Each of the members of our population has one of four objective pairs. We simulate a tournament similar to those in previous work to investigate patterns of convergence in objective pairs when they are free to change. We also consider the most successful objective pair within a population when members' objective pairs are fixed.
- Robert Axelrod. 1987. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The dynamics of norms (1987), 1--16.Google Scholar
- Paul Darwen and Xin Yao. 2002. Co-evolution in iterated prisoner's dilemma with intermediate levels of cooperation: Application to missile defense. International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Applications 2, 01 (2002), 83--107.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Kalyanmoy Deb, Amrit Pratap, Sameer Agarwal, and T. Meyarivan. 2002. A fast and elitist multiobjective genetic algorithm: NSGA-II. IEEE transactions on evolutionary computation 6, 2 (2002), 182--197. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Wojciech Jaśkowski, Pawe l Liskowski, Marcin Szubert, and Krzysztof Krawiec. 2013. Improving coevolution by random sampling. In Proceedings of the 15th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation. ACM, 1141--1148. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Jason D Lohn, Gary L Haith, Silvano P Colombano, and Dimitris Stassinopoulos. 1999. A comparison of dynamic fitness schedules for evolutionary design of amplifiers. In Proceedings of the First NASA/DoD Workshop on Evolvable Hardware. IEEE, 87--92. Google ScholarDigital Library
- John H. Miller. 1993. The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Technical Report. Carnegie Mellon, Department of Decision Sciences. http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:carnds:_007Google Scholar
- Shashi Mittal and Kalyanmoy Deb. 2009. Optimal strategies of the iterated prisoner's dilemma problem for multiple conflicting objectives. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation 13, 3 (2009), 554--565. Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- Social trends in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Recommendations
Differences between the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions
SAC '02: Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computingThe prisoner's dilemma has evolved into a standard game for analyzing the success of cooperative strategies in repeated games. With the aim of investigating the behavior of strategies in some alternative games we analyzed the outcome of iterated games ...
Two-stage N-person Prisoner's Dilemma with Social Preferences
AAMAS '19: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent SystemsWe examine two-stage games where all players choose the parameters of social preferences at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage with perfect and imperfect information. This model expresses situations where ...
Iterated symmetric three-player prisoner's dilemma game
Although, most game theory researches on the prisoner's dilemma have centered on two-player models, it is possible to create it to be consisted of three or even more players. In this paper, we are interested in the model of three-player iterated ...
Comments