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Playing a Multi-objective Spot-checking Game in Public Transportation Systems

Published: 19 June 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Public transportation systems represent an essential sector of any nation's critical infrastructure. Hence, continuity of their services is deemed important and with a high priority to the nations. Concerns over risks like terrorism, criminal offenses, and business revenue loss impose the need for enhancing situation awareness in these systems. However, practices, such as conducting random patrols or regular spot-checks on passengers to prevent or deter potential violations, are strictly limited by the number of available resources (e.g. security staff or fare inspectors) and by the ability of potential opponents (e.g. criminals, or fare evaders) to predict or observe the inspectors' presence patterns. Casting the interactions between these competitive entities (inspectors/security officials and criminals/fare dodgers) into a game-theoretic model will enable involved system operators to 1) find optimal cost-effective (or multi-goal) human resource allocation or spot-check schedules, 2) capture and treat uncertainty due to imperfectness of information, 3) integrate measurements from heterogeneous natures (e.g. statistics, expert opinions, or simulation results). This work applies a game-theoretical model that uses random probability-distribution-valued payoffs to allow playing spot-checking games with diverging actions' outcomes as well as avoiding information loss due to combining several measurements into one representative (e.g. average).

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Cited By

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  • (2024)What Lies Behind Fare Evasion in Curb Parking Behavior? Evidence from Nanjing, ChinaTransportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board10.1177/036119812412364702678:10(1221-1238)Online publication date: 27-Mar-2024
  • (2020)Fare evasion in public transport systems: a review of the literaturePublic Transport10.1007/s12469-019-00225-wOnline publication date: 14-Feb-2020
  • (2018)G-DPS: A Game-Theoretical Decision-Making Framework for Physical Surveillance GamesGame Theory for Security and Risk Management10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_6(129-156)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2018
  • Show More Cited By

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      cover image ACM Other conferences
      SHCIS '17: Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems
      June 2017
      53 pages
      ISBN:9781450352710
      DOI:10.1145/3099012
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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      Publication History

      Published: 19 June 2017

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      Author Tags

      1. Critical infrastructure
      2. fare evasion
      3. game theory
      4. multi-goal optimization
      5. public transportation network
      6. randomness
      7. uncertainty

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      SHCIS '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 8 of 11 submissions, 73%;
      Overall Acceptance Rate 8 of 11 submissions, 73%

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      Cited By

      View all
      • (2024)What Lies Behind Fare Evasion in Curb Parking Behavior? Evidence from Nanjing, ChinaTransportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board10.1177/036119812412364702678:10(1221-1238)Online publication date: 27-Mar-2024
      • (2020)Fare evasion in public transport systems: a review of the literaturePublic Transport10.1007/s12469-019-00225-wOnline publication date: 14-Feb-2020
      • (2018)G-DPS: A Game-Theoretical Decision-Making Framework for Physical Surveillance GamesGame Theory for Security and Risk Management10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_6(129-156)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2018
      • (2018)Game-Theoretic Optimization for Physical Surveillance of Critical Infrastructures: A Case StudyGame Theory for Security and Risk Management10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_15(353-389)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2018

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