research-article

Playing a Multi-objective Spot-checking Game in Public Transportation Systems

Authors:

Mohamed Amine Abid,

Hermann de MeerAuthors Info & Claims

SHCIS '17: Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems

Pages 31 - 36

https://doi.org/10.1145/3099012.3099019

Published: 19 June 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Public transportation systems represent an essential sector of any nation's critical infrastructure. Hence, continuity of their services is deemed important and with a high priority to the nations. Concerns over risks like terrorism, criminal offenses, and business revenue loss impose the need for enhancing situation awareness in these systems. However, practices, such as conducting random patrols or regular spot-checks on passengers to prevent or deter potential violations, are strictly limited by the number of available resources (e.g. security staff or fare inspectors) and by the ability of potential opponents (e.g. criminals, or fare evaders) to predict or observe the inspectors' presence patterns. Casting the interactions between these competitive entities (inspectors/security officials and criminals/fare dodgers) into a game-theoretic model will enable involved system operators to 1) find optimal cost-effective (or multi-goal) human resource allocation or spot-check schedules, 2) capture and treat uncertainty due to imperfectness of information, 3) integrate measurements from heterogeneous natures (e.g. statistics, expert opinions, or simulation results). This work applies a game-theoretical model that uses random probability-distribution-valued payoffs to allow playing spot-checking games with diverging actions' outcomes as well as avoiding information loss due to combining several measurements into one representative (e.g. average).

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Cited By

Zhou XYan JDing XJi Y(2024)What Lies Behind Fare Evasion in Curb Parking Behavior? Evidence from Nanjing, ChinaTransportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board10.1177/036119812412364702678:10(1221-1238)Online publication date: 27-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1177/03611981241236470
Barabino BLai COlivo A(2020)Fare evasion in public transport systems: a review of the literaturePublic Transport10.1007/s12469-019-00225-wOnline publication date: 14-Feb-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12469-019-00225-w
Alshawish AAbid Mde Meer HSchauer SKönig SGouglidis AHutchison D(2018)G-DPS: A Game-Theoretical Decision-Making Framework for Physical Surveillance GamesGame Theory for Security and Risk Management10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_6(129-156)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_6
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Playing a Multi-objective Spot-checking Game in Public Transportation Systems
1. Mathematics of computing
  1. Mathematical analysis
    1. Mathematical optimization
2. Security and privacy
  1. Security services

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cover image ACM Other conferences

SHCIS '17: Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems

June 2017

53 pages

ISBN:9781450352710

DOI:10.1145/3099012

Copyright © 2017 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Publication History

Published: 19 June 2017

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SHCIS '17

SHCIS '17: Workshop on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems

June 19 - 22, 2017

Neuchâtel, Switzerland

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SHCIS '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 8 of 11 submissions, 73%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 8 of 11 submissions, 73%

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Cited By

Zhou XYan JDing XJi Y(2024)What Lies Behind Fare Evasion in Curb Parking Behavior? Evidence from Nanjing, ChinaTransportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board10.1177/036119812412364702678:10(1221-1238)Online publication date: 27-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1177/03611981241236470
Barabino BLai COlivo A(2020)Fare evasion in public transport systems: a review of the literaturePublic Transport10.1007/s12469-019-00225-wOnline publication date: 14-Feb-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12469-019-00225-w
Alshawish AAbid Mde Meer HSchauer SKönig SGouglidis AHutchison D(2018)G-DPS: A Game-Theoretical Decision-Making Framework for Physical Surveillance GamesGame Theory for Security and Risk Management10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_6(129-156)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_6
Alshawish AAbid Mde Meer H(2018)Game-Theoretic Optimization for Physical Surveillance of Critical Infrastructures: A Case StudyGame Theory for Security and Risk Management10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_15(353-389)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_15

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