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Emerging (un-)reliability based security threats and mitigations for embedded systems: special session

Published:15 October 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses two reliability-based security threats and mitigations for embedded systems namely, aging and thermal side channels. Device aging can be used as a hardware attack vector by using voltage scaling or specially crafted instruction sequences to violate embedded processor guard bands. Short-term aging effects can be utilized to cause transient degradation of the embedded device without leaving any trace of the attack. (Thermal) side channels can be used as an attack vector and as a defense. Specifically, thermal side channels are an effective and secure way to remotely monitor code execution on an embedded processor and/or to possibly leak information. Although various algorithmic means to detect anomaly are available, machine learning tools are effective for anomaly detection. We will show such utilization of deep learning networks in conjunction with thermal side channels to detect code injection/modification representing anomaly.

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      CASES '17: Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems Companion
      October 2017
      51 pages
      ISBN:9781450351843
      DOI:10.1145/3125501

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      • Published: 15 October 2017

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