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Hardening Opportunistic HIP

Published:21 November 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

As mobile and multi-homed devices are becoming ubiquitous, the need for a dynamic, yet secure communication protocol is unavoidable. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) was constructed to meet this requirement; to provide significantly more secure mobility and multi-homing capabilities. HIP opportunistic mode, which is to be used when other, more trusted mechanisms are lacking, is based on a leap of faith (LoF) paradigm. In this paper, we analyze different Man in the middle (MiTM) attacks which might occur under this LoF, and propose a set of tweaks for hardening opportunistic HIP (HOH) that strengthen opportunistic mode's security.

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        cover image ACM Conferences
        MSWiM '17: Proceedings of the 20th ACM International Conference on Modelling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems
        November 2017
        340 pages
        ISBN:9781450351621
        DOI:10.1145/3127540

        Copyright © 2017 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 21 November 2017

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        MSWiM '17 Paper Acceptance Rate29of142submissions,20%Overall Acceptance Rate398of1,577submissions,25%

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