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Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?

Published: 29 November 2017 Publication History

Abstract

“Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?”
The Evil Queen
What is a fair way to assign rooms to several housemates and divide the rent between them? This is not just a theoretical question: many people have used the Spliddit website to obtain envy-free solutions to rent division instances. But envy freeness, in and of itself, is insufficient to guarantee outcomes that people view as intuitive and acceptable. We therefore focus on solutions that optimize a criterion of social justice, subject to the envy-freeness constraint, in order to pinpoint the “fairest” solutions. We develop a general algorithmic framework that enables the computation of such solutions in polynomial time. We then study the relations between natural optimization objectives and identify the maximin solution, which maximizes the minimum utility subject to envy freeness, as the most attractive. We demonstrate, in theory and using experiments on real data from Spliddit, that the maximin solution gives rise to significant gains in terms of our optimization objectives. Finally, a user study with Spliddit users as subjects demonstrates that people find the maximin solution to be significantly fairer than arbitrary envy-free solutions; this user study is unprecedented in that it asks people about their real-world rent division instances. Based on these results, the maximin solution has been deployed on Spliddit since April 2015.

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Published In

cover image Journal of the ACM
Journal of the ACM  Volume 64, Issue 6
December 2017
217 pages
ISSN:0004-5411
EISSN:1557-735X
DOI:10.1145/3145801
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 29 November 2017
Accepted: 01 July 2017
Received: 01 September 2016
Published in JACM Volume 64, Issue 6

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  • (2024)Nearly equitable allocations beyond additivity and monotonicityProceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Sixth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Fourteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28804(9494-9501)Online publication date: 20-Feb-2024
  • (2024)Learning to Be Fair: A Consequentialist Approach to Equitable Decision MakingManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2022.00345Online publication date: 18-Dec-2024
  • (2024)"I'll pay half the cost, for the loft" -- From Searching to Agreeing on Group Property RentalsCompanion Publication of the 2024 Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing10.1145/3678884.3681908(572-578)Online publication date: 11-Nov-2024
  • (2024)Envy-free house allocation with minimum subsidyOperations Research Letters10.1016/j.orl.2024.10710354(107103)Online publication date: May-2024
  • (2024)Manipulation and peer mechanisms: A surveyArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2024.104196336(104196)Online publication date: Nov-2024
  • (2023)Pushing the limits of fairness in algorithmic decision-makingProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/806(7051-7056)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
  • (2023)Equitable rent division on a soft budgetGames and Economic Behavior10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.008139(1-14)Online publication date: May-2023
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  • (2022)Efficient Fair Division with Minimal SharingOperations Research10.1287/opre.2022.227970:3(1762-1782)Online publication date: 1-May-2022
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