ABSTRACT
Control of conventional transportation networks aims at bringing the state of the network to the system optimal (SO) state. This optimum is characterized by the minimality of the social cost function, i.e., the total cost of travel of all drivers. On the other hand, drivers are assumed to be rational and selfish, and make their travel decisions to optimize their own travel costs, bringing the state of the network to a user equilibrium (UE). In this paper, we model the behavior of users in the future connected vehicular transportation networks, where users consider both the travel cost and the utility from data communication when making their travel decisions. We divide the users into two groups based on the kind of data network they are using. We leverage the data communication aspect of the decision making to influence the user route choices, driving the UE state to the SO state. We propose a V2I bandwidth allocation scheme, which provides a guideline on how the system operator can adjust the parameters of the communication network to achieve the optimal UE.
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Index Terms
- Infrastructure Bandwidth Allocation for Social Welfare Maximization in Future Connected Autonomous Vehicular Networks
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