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Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?

Authors:

Kobi Gal,

Ariel D. Procaccia,

Moshe Mash,

Yair ZickAuthors Info & Claims

Communications of the ACM, Volume 61, Issue 2

Pages 93 - 100

https://doi.org/10.1145/3166068

Published: 23 January 2018 Publication History

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0
Brams SLandweber P(undefined)3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting AlgorithmSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3126935
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126935

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Which is the fairest (rent division) of them all?

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Communications of the ACM Volume 61, Issue 2

February 2018

94 pages

ISSN:0001-0782

EISSN:1557-7317

DOI:10.1145/3181977

Editor:
Andrew A. Chien
Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY

Issue’s Table of Contents

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Published: 23 January 2018

Published in CACM Volume 61, Issue 2

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Jordán JTorreño Ade Weerdt MOnaindia E(2020)A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent PlanningGroup Decision and Negotiation10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0Online publication date: 5-Sep-2020
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0
Brams SLandweber P(undefined)3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting AlgorithmSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3126935
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126935

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Cognitive Hybrid Division Duplex for Two-Tier Femtocell Networks

A Distributed Contention Vector Division Multiple Access (D-CVDMA) Protocol for Wireless Networks

On partitioning vs. placement rent properties

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