Shuai Chen
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Abstract
Protection of intellectual property (IP) is increasingly critical for IP vendors in the semiconductor industry. However, advanced reverse engineering techniques can physically disassemble the chip and derive the IPs at a much lower cost than the value of IP design that chips carry. This invasive hardware attack—obtaining information from IC chips—always violates the IP rights of vendors. The intent of this article is to present a chip-level reverse engineering resilient design technique. In the proposed technique, transformable interconnects enable an IC chip to maintain functioning in normal use and to transform its physical structure into another pattern when exposed to invasive attacks. The newly created pattern will significantly increase the difficulty of reverse engineering. Furthermore, to improve the effectiveness of the proposed technique, a systematic design method is developed targeting integrated circuits with multiple design constraints. Simulations have been conducted to demonstrate the capability of the proposed technique, which generates extremely large complexity for reverse engineering with manageable overhead.
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Index Terms
- A Chip-Level Anti-Reverse Engineering Technique
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