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Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Authors:

Vahab Mirrokni,

Renato Paes Leme,

Song ZuoAuthors Info & Claims

WWW '18: Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference

Pages 1359 - 1368

https://doi.org/10.1145/3178876.3186041

Published: 10 April 2018 Publication History

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Abstract

Dynamic mechanisms are a powerful technique in designing revenue-maximizing repeated auctions. Despite their strength, these types of mechanisms have not been widely adopted in practice for several reasons, e.g., for their complexity, and for their sensitivity to the accuracy of predicting buyers» value distributions. In this paper, we aim to address these shortcomings and develop simple dynamic mechanisms that can be implemented efficiently, and provide theoretical guidelines for decreasing the sensitivity of dynamic mechanisms on prediction accuracy of buyers» value distributions. We prove that the dynamic mechanism we propose is provably dynamic incentive compatible, and introduce a notion of buyers» regret in dynamic mechanisms, and show that our mechanism achieves bounded regret while improving revenue and social welfare compared to a static reserve pricing policy. Finally, we confirm our theoretical analysis via an extensive empirical study of our dynamic auction on real data sets from online adverting. For example, we show our dynamic mechanisms can provide a +17% revenue lift with relative regret less than 0.2%.

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Cited By

Cai YFeng ZLiaw CMehta AVelegkas GChua TNgo CKa-Wei Lee RKumar RLauw H(2024)User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-term Revenue OptimizationProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202410.1145/3589334.3645495(111-122)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3589334.3645495
Shen WTang PZuo SShen WTang PZuo S(2024)Dynamic Mechanism Design via AI-Driven ApproachesAI-Driven Mechanism Design10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3(53-93)Online publication date: 30-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3
Deng YMao JMirrokni VZhang HZuo S(2023)Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User CostsProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202310.1145/3543507.3583234(3428-3435)Online publication date: 30-Apr-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3543507.3583234
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences

WWW '18: Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference

April 2018

2000 pages

ISBN:9781450356398

General Chairs:
Pierre-Antoine Champin
Universitè Claude Bernard Lyon 1, France
,
Fabien Gandon
Inria, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, I3S, France
,
Lionel Médini
Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, France
,
Program Chairs:
Mounia Lalmas
Spotify, UK
,
Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis
New York University, USA

Copyright © 2018 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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IW3C2: International World Wide Web Conference Committee

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SIGWEB: ACM Special Interest Group on Hypertext, Hypermedia, and Web

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International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee

Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland

Publication History

Published: 10 April 2018

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Research-article

Funding Sources

a Tsinghua Initiative Scientific Research Grant
the Natural Science Foundation of China Grant
a China Youth 1000-talent program
the National Basic Research Program of China Grant

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WWW '18

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IW3C2

WWW '18: The Web Conference 2018

April 23 - 27, 2018

Lyon, France

Acceptance Rates

WWW '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 170 of 1,155 submissions, 15%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,899 of 8,196 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

Cai YFeng ZLiaw CMehta AVelegkas GChua TNgo CKa-Wei Lee RKumar RLauw H(2024)User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-term Revenue OptimizationProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202410.1145/3589334.3645495(111-122)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3589334.3645495
Shen WTang PZuo SShen WTang PZuo S(2024)Dynamic Mechanism Design via AI-Driven ApproachesAI-Driven Mechanism Design10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3(53-93)Online publication date: 30-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-9286-3_3
Deng YMao JMirrokni VZhang HZuo S(2023)Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User CostsProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202310.1145/3543507.3583234(3428-3435)Online publication date: 30-Apr-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3543507.3583234
Balseiro SMirrokni VLeme RZuo SMarx D(2021)Non-excludable dynamic mechanism designProceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms10.5555/3458064.3458146(1357-1373)Online publication date: 10-Jan-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3458064.3458146
Wang YJin JZheng ZXu HWu FJiang YChen G(2021)Multi-objective Dynamic Auction Mechanism for Online Advertising2021 IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference (IPCCC)10.1109/IPCCC51483.2021.9679425(1-8)Online publication date: 29-Oct-2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/IPCCC51483.2021.9679425
Shen WTang PZuo SElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Automated Mechanism Design via Neural NetworksProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331696(215-223)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331696
Deng YLahaie STeredesai AKumar VLi YRosales RTerzi EKarypis G(2019)Testing Dynamic Incentive Compatibility in Display Ad AuctionsProceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining10.1145/3292500.3330943(1616-1624)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3292500.3330943
Shen WWang ZZuo S(2018)Ex-post IR dynamic auctions with cost-per-action paymentsProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304487(505-511)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304487
Shen WWang ZZuo SAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-action PaymentsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3238077(2076-2078)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3238077
Balseiro SMirrokni VPaes Leme RZuo S(undefined)Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First BestSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3213460
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213460

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