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View all- Ganor AS. KPálvölgyi D(2021)On Communication Complexity of Fixed Point ComputationACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/34850049:4(1-27)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2021
Mechanism design for one-sided markets is an area of extensive research in economics and, since more than a decade, in computer science as well. Two-sided markets, on the other hand, have not received the same attention despite the numerous applications ...
We consider the existence of Partition Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games. Super-strong equilibrium, where no subset of players has an incentive to change their strategies collectively, does not always exist in such games. We show, however, that ...
We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffontï ź[13] proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms that are approximately ...
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