Data Activated Processor Hardware Trojan Detection Using Differential Bit Power Analysis
Pages 134 - 137
Abstract
Processor is the core chip of modern information processing system, which is seriously threatened by hardware Trojan. Side-channel analysis is the most promising method for hardware Trojan detection. However, most existing side-channel based detection approaches require golden chips as reference, which significantly increases the test cost and complexity. In this paper, we present a novel differential bit power analysis method which can detect data activated processor hardware Trojan without the need of golden chips or models. The proposed method exploits the intrinsic consistency of bit powers to detect outliers impacted by hardware Trojans. Data related power model of processor is amended. Differential bit power analysis program is proposed. Experimental measurements are done on field programmable gate array chip with open source 8051 processor and hardware Trojans. The effectiveness of propose method is proved by experiment results.
References
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Bhunia, S., Hsiao, M.S., and Banga, M. 2014. Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures. Proceedings of the IEEE, 102(8), 1229--1247.
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King, S. T., Tucek, J., Cozzie, A., et al. 2008. Designing and implementing malicious hardware. USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats(San Francisco, CA, USA, April 2008). IEEE, New York, NY, 31--37.
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NYU Cyber-Security Awareness Week: Embedded Systems Challenge. http://www.poly.edu/csaw-embedded
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Published In
March 2018
187 pages
ISBN:9781450363617
DOI:10.1145/3199478
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In-Cooperation
- Wuhan Univ.: Wuhan University, China
- University of Electronic Science and Technology of China: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 16 March 2018
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- Research-article
- Research
- Refereed limited
Funding Sources
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Conference
ICCSP 2018
ICCSP 2018: 2018 the 2nd International Conference on Cryptography, Security and Privacy
March 16 - 19, 2018
Guiyang, China
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