skip to main content
10.1145/3289602.3293923acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesfpgaConference Proceedingsconference-collections
short-paper

Characterization of Long Wire Data Leakage in Deep Submicron FPGAs

Published:20 February 2019Publication History

ABSTRACT

The simultaneous use of FPGAs by multiple tenants has recently been shown to potentially expose sensitive information without the victim's knowledge. For example, neighboring long wires in SRAM-based FPGAs have been shown to allow for clandestine data exfiltration. In this work, we explore distinct characteristics of this signal crosstalk that could be used to enhance or prevent information leakage. First, we develop a mechanism to characterize the crosstalk coupling that exists between neighboring wires at the femtosecond scale. Second, we show that it is possible to reverse engineer channel layouts by determining which pairs of routing resources/links in the channel exhibit coupling to each other even if this information is not provided by the FPGA vendor. To fully characterize these effects, we examine long wire coupling on different types of wires across three devices implemented in different technology nodes from 65 to 20 nm. We experimentally demonstrate that information leakage is apparent for all three FPGA families.

References

  1. I. Giechaskiel, K. B. Rasmussen, and K. Eguro. 2018. Leaky Wires: Information Leakage and Covert Communication Between FPGA Long Wires. In Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15--27. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  2. D. R. E. Gnad, F. Oboril, S. Kiamehr, and M. B. Tahoori. 2018. An Experimental Evaluation and Analysis of Transient Voltage Fluctuations in FPGAs. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems 26, 10 (Oct 2018), 1817--1830.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  3. B. Gojman, S. Nalmela, N. Mehta, N. Howarth, and A. DeHon. 2015. GROK-LAB: Generating real on-chip knowledge for intra-cluster delays using timing extraction. ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems (TRETS) 7, 4 (2015), 32. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  4. C. Ramesh, S. B. Patil, S. N. Dhanuskodi, G. Provelengios, S. Pillement, D. Holcomb, and R. Tessier. 2018. FPGA side channel attacks without physical access. In IEEE International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines. 45--52.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  5. F. Schellenberg, D. R. E. Gnad, A. Moradi, and M. B. Tahoori. 2018. An inside job: Remote power analysis attacks on FPGAs. In Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition, DATE 2018.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  6. S. Yazdanshenas and V. Betz. 2018. Interconnect Solutions for Virtualized Field- Programmable Gate Arrays. IEEE Access 6 (Feb. 2018), 10497--10507.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  7. H. Yu, Q. Xu, and P. H. W. Leong. 2010. Fine-grained characterization of process variation in FPGAs. In 2010 International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology. 138--145.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  8. M. Zhao and G. E. Suh. 2018. FPGA-based remote power side-channel attacks. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 229--244.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar

Recommendations

Comments

Login options

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

Sign in
  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    FPGA '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/SIGDA International Symposium on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays
    February 2019
    360 pages
    ISBN:9781450361378
    DOI:10.1145/3289602

    Copyright © 2019 ACM

    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 20 February 2019

    Permissions

    Request permissions about this article.

    Request Permissions

    Check for updates

    Qualifiers

    • short-paper

    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate125of627submissions,20%

PDF Format

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader