skip to main content
10.1145/3289602.3293923acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesfpgaConference Proceedingsconference-collections
short-paper

Characterization of Long Wire Data Leakage in Deep Submicron FPGAs

Published: 20 February 2019 Publication History

Abstract

The simultaneous use of FPGAs by multiple tenants has recently been shown to potentially expose sensitive information without the victim's knowledge. For example, neighboring long wires in SRAM-based FPGAs have been shown to allow for clandestine data exfiltration. In this work, we explore distinct characteristics of this signal crosstalk that could be used to enhance or prevent information leakage. First, we develop a mechanism to characterize the crosstalk coupling that exists between neighboring wires at the femtosecond scale. Second, we show that it is possible to reverse engineer channel layouts by determining which pairs of routing resources/links in the channel exhibit coupling to each other even if this information is not provided by the FPGA vendor. To fully characterize these effects, we examine long wire coupling on different types of wires across three devices implemented in different technology nodes from 65 to 20 nm. We experimentally demonstrate that information leakage is apparent for all three FPGA families.

References

[1]
I. Giechaskiel, K. B. Rasmussen, and K. Eguro. 2018. Leaky Wires: Information Leakage and Covert Communication Between FPGA Long Wires. In Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15--27.
[2]
D. R. E. Gnad, F. Oboril, S. Kiamehr, and M. B. Tahoori. 2018. An Experimental Evaluation and Analysis of Transient Voltage Fluctuations in FPGAs. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems 26, 10 (Oct 2018), 1817--1830.
[3]
B. Gojman, S. Nalmela, N. Mehta, N. Howarth, and A. DeHon. 2015. GROK-LAB: Generating real on-chip knowledge for intra-cluster delays using timing extraction. ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems (TRETS) 7, 4 (2015), 32.
[4]
C. Ramesh, S. B. Patil, S. N. Dhanuskodi, G. Provelengios, S. Pillement, D. Holcomb, and R. Tessier. 2018. FPGA side channel attacks without physical access. In IEEE International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines. 45--52.
[5]
F. Schellenberg, D. R. E. Gnad, A. Moradi, and M. B. Tahoori. 2018. An inside job: Remote power analysis attacks on FPGAs. In Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition, DATE 2018.
[6]
S. Yazdanshenas and V. Betz. 2018. Interconnect Solutions for Virtualized Field- Programmable Gate Arrays. IEEE Access 6 (Feb. 2018), 10497--10507.
[7]
H. Yu, Q. Xu, and P. H. W. Leong. 2010. Fine-grained characterization of process variation in FPGAs. In 2010 International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology. 138--145.
[8]
M. Zhao and G. E. Suh. 2018. FPGA-based remote power side-channel attacks. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 229--244.

Cited By

View all
  • (2025)Power and Frequency Intrinsic Channels on gem5IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers10.1109/TCSI.2024.343584172:2(671-684)Online publication date: Feb-2025
  • (2023)Learning Malicious Circuits in FPGA BitstreamsIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2022.319077142:3(726-739)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
  • (2023)Emulating Covert Data Transmission on Heterogeneous SoCs2023 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST)10.1109/AsianHOST59942.2023.10409377(1-6)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2023
  • Show More Cited By

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
FPGA '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/SIGDA International Symposium on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays
February 2019
360 pages
ISBN:9781450361378
DOI:10.1145/3289602
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Sponsors

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 20 February 2019

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. crosstalk
  2. fpga
  3. side channel

Qualifiers

  • Short-paper

Funding Sources

  • NSF/SRC
  • Intel's Corporate Research Council

Conference

FPGA '19
Sponsor:

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 125 of 627 submissions, 20%

Upcoming Conference

FPGA '25

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)26
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)3
Reflects downloads up to 13 Feb 2025

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2025)Power and Frequency Intrinsic Channels on gem5IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers10.1109/TCSI.2024.343584172:2(671-684)Online publication date: Feb-2025
  • (2023)Learning Malicious Circuits in FPGA BitstreamsIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2022.319077142:3(726-739)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
  • (2023)Emulating Covert Data Transmission on Heterogeneous SoCs2023 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST)10.1109/AsianHOST59942.2023.10409377(1-6)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2023
  • (2023)Fingerprinting and Mapping Cloud FPGA InfrastructuresSecurity of FPGA-Accelerated Cloud Computing Environments10.1007/978-3-031-45395-3_9(239-272)Online publication date: 18-Sep-2023
  • (2023)Countermeasures Against Voltage Attacks in Multi-tenant FPGAsSecurity of FPGA-Accelerated Cloud Computing Environments10.1007/978-3-031-45395-3_10(273-295)Online publication date: 18-Sep-2023
  • (2022)Long-Wire Leakage: The Threat of CrosstalkIEEE Design & Test10.1109/MDAT.2022.314219939:4(41-48)Online publication date: Aug-2022
  • (2021)FPGAPRO: A Defense Framework Against Crosstalk-Induced Secret Leakage in FPGAACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems10.1145/349121427:3(1-31)Online publication date: 17-Nov-2021
  • (2021)Voltage-Based Covert Channels Using FPGAsACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems10.1145/346022926:6(1-25)Online publication date: 28-Jun-2021
  • (2021)Stealing Neural Network Structure Through Remote FPGA Side-Channel AnalysisIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2021.310616916(4377-4388)Online publication date: 2021
  • (2021)Review of Side Channel Attacks and Countermeasures of FPGA Based Systems2021 IEEE 19th Student Conference on Research and Development (SCOReD)10.1109/SCOReD53546.2021.9652773(102-107)Online publication date: 23-Nov-2021
  • Show More Cited By

View Options

Login options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Figures

Tables

Media

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media