2019 Proceeding- General Chairs:
- Chip Hong Chang,
- Ulrich Rührmair,
- Program Chairs:
- Daniel Holcomb,
- Patrick Schaumont
- Sponsor:
- sigsac
It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the Third Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security 2019 (ASHES 2019), a post-conference satellite workshop of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2019 (CCS 2019) in London, UK!
ASHES deals with all aspects of hardware security, and welcomes any contributions to this area. Besides being a forum for mainstream hardware security research, its mission is to specifically foster new concepts, solutions, and methodological approaches, and to promote new application scenarios. This includes, for example, new attack vectors on secure hardware, the merger of nanotechnology and hardware security, novel designs and materials, lightweight security hardware, and physical unclonable functions (PUFs) on the methodological side, as well as the internet of things, automotive security, smart homes, supply chain security, pervasive and wearable computing on the applications side. ASHES thereby aims at giving researchers and practitioners a unique opportunity to share their perspectives with others on various emerging aspects of hardware security research.
Proceeding Downloads
Towards an Open Approach to Side-Channel Resistant Authenticated Encryption
In this talk, I will discuss how recent advances in side-channel analysis and leakage-resilience could lead to both stronger security properties and improved confidence in cryptographic implementations. For this purpose, I will start by describing how ...
Breaking TrustZone Memory Isolation through Malicious Hardware on a Modern FPGA-SoC
FPGA-SoCs are heterogeneous computing systems consisting of reconfigurable hardware and high performance processing units. This combination enables a flexible design methodology for embedded systems. However, the sharing of resources between these ...
Simple Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks based on Geometric Leak on an ASIC Implementation of Ring-Oscillator PUF
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are assumed to provide high tamper resistance against counterfeiting and hardware attacks since PUFs extract inherent physical properties from random and uncontrollable variations in manufacturing. Recent studies ...
Breaking Mobile Firmware Encryption through Near-Field Side-Channel Analysis
Physical attacks constitute a significant threat for any cryptosystem. Among them, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is a common practice to stress the security of embedded devices like smartcards or secure controllers. Nowadays, it has become more than ...
Fault Intensity Map Analysis with Neural Network Key Distinguisher
Physical cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks, including fault attacks, which can be used to recover a secret key. Using a deep neural network (NN) with fault intensity map analysis (FIMA), we present a new highly ...
SCA Secure and Updatable Crypto Engines for FPGA SoC Bitstream Decryption
FPGA system on chips (SoCs) are ideal computing platforms for edge devices in applications which require high performance through hardware acceleration and updatability due to long operation in the field. A secure update of hardware functionality can in ...
Adaptive Caches as a Defense Mechanism Against Cache Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks exploit architectural features of computing systems and algorithmic properties of applications executing on these systems to steal sensitive information. Cache side-channel attacks are more powerful and practical compared to other ...
SoK: An Overview of Algorithmic Methods in IC Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering of integrated circuits (IC) serves an evergrowing need for both defensive and offensive applications, such as competitive analysis, IP theft evidence and hardware Trojan detection. The IC reverse engineering process comprises two ...
TGA: An Oracle-less and Topology-Guided Attack on Logic Locking
Due to the outsourcing of semiconductor design and manufacturing, a number of threats have emerged in recent years, and they are overproduction of integrated circuits (ICs), illegal sale of defective ICs, and piracy of intellectual properties (IPs). ...
Peak Clock: Fault Injection into PLL-Based Systems via Clock Manipulation
Clock glitches are an inexpensive method to attack embedded systems. Usually the intention is to alter the program flow or to extract cryptographic keys. However, the wide-spread use of Phase Locked Loops (PLLs) prohibits the direct reach-through on the ...
A Low-Cost Replica-Based Distance-Spoofing Attack on mmWave FMCW Radar
This paper presents a low-cost distance-spoofing attack on a mmWave Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar. It uses only a replica radar chipset and a single compact microcontroller board both in mass production. No expensive and bulky test ...
A Large Scale Comprehensive Evaluation of Single-Slice Ring Oscillator and PicoPUF Bit Cells on 28nm Xilinx FPGAs
Many field programmable gate array (FPGA)-based security primitives have been developed, e.g., physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and true random number generator (TRNG). To accurately evaluate the performance of a PUF or other security designs, data ...
- Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security Workshop
Recommendations
Acceptance Rates
| Year | Submitted | Accepted | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASHES '17 | 20 | 6 | 30% |
| Overall | 20 | 6 | 30% |