research-article

Leveraging Side-Channel Information for Disassembly and Security

Authors:

Apostol Vassilev,

Mark TehranipoorAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC), Volume 16, Issue 1

Article No.: 6, Pages 1 - 21

https://doi.org/10.1145/3359621

Published: 18 December 2019 Publication History

Abstract

With the rise of Internet of Things (IoT), devices such as smartphones, embedded medical devices, smart home appliances, as well as traditional computing platforms such as personal computers and servers have been increasingly targeted with a variety of cyber attacks. Due to limited hardware resources for embedded devices and difficulty in wide-coverage and on-time software updates, software-only cyber defense techniques, such as traditional anti-virus and malware detectors, do not offer a silver-bullet solution. Hardware-based security monitoring and protection techniques, therefore, have gained significant attention. Monitoring devices using side-channel leakage information, e.g., power supply variation and electromagnetic (EM) radiation, is a promising avenue that promotes multiple directions in security and trust applications. In this article, we provide a taxonomy of hardware-based monitoring techniques against different cyber and hardware attacks, highlight the potentials and unique challenges, and display how power-based side-channel instruction-level monitoring can offer suitable solutions to prevailing embedded device security issues. Further, we delineate approaches for future research directions.

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Published In

cover image ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems

ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems Volume 16, Issue 1

January 2020

232 pages

ISSN:1550-4832

EISSN:1550-4840

DOI:10.1145/3365593

Editor:
Ramesh Karri
Polytechnic Institute of New York University, USA

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Copyright © 2019 ACM.

© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of the United States government. As such, the United States Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only.

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ACM Journals for the Design of Smart and Connected Systems

Publication History

Published: 18 December 2019

Accepted: 01 August 2019

Revised: 01 July 2019

Received: 01 March 2018

Published in JETC Volume 16, Issue 1

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2024.126079
Iyer VRezac J(2024)Using EM Side-Channels Near a Bluetooth Server Implementation to Monitor Bit-Level Leakages in BLE Communication ChannelsProceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 202410.1145/3649476.3658742(459-464)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3649476.3658742
Ibrahim YKermanshahi SKasmarik KHu J(2024)A Taxonomy-Based Survey of EM-SCA and Implications for Multi-Robot SystemsIEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society10.1109/OJCS.2024.34618085(511-529)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/OJCS.2024.3461808
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