A. F. M. Saifuddin Saif
Mokaddesh Rashid
ABSTRACT
In Bangladesh, a central exam is given by lots of students each year to get themselves admitted into their preferred medical college and only few get chosen by their merits. Assigning each student to a college and checking the validity of the assignment is a major concern here. This particular problem dates back to 1962 when college admission problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley [5] where stable marriage approach was used as a solution. Stability criteria was also introduced in their research which can be used to check validation of fair matching when priority is involved. But, Complicacy arises as in Bangladesh some seats are reserved for special students known as quota which can not be solved with plain stable marriage algorithm. Stability criteria also has to be defined properly for this specific problem and an algorithm is needed to handle this. A max-flow, min-cut solution combined with stable marriage algorithm is presented in this research to solve medical admission process with quota constraint in Bangladesh.
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Index Terms
- Stable Marriage Algorithm for Student-College Matching with Quota Constraints
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