Yajun Yang
Yier Jin
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Abstract
With the trend of outsourcing fabrication, split manufacturing is regarded as a promising way to both acquire the high-end nodes in untrusted external foundries and protect the design from potential attackers. However, in this article, we show that split manufacturing is not inherently secure, that a hardware Trojan attacker can still recover necessary information with a proximity-based or a simulated-annealing-based mapping approach together with a probability-based or net-based pruning method at the placement level. We further propose a defense approach by moving the insecure gates away from their easily attacked candidate locations. Results on benchmark circuits show the effectiveness of our proposed methods.
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Index Terms
- How Secure Is Split Manufacturing in Preventing Hardware Trojan?
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