Cited By
View all- Jin YJiang SLu PZhang H(2022)Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit MechanismsSIAM Journal on Computing10.1137/21M145636451:5(1535-1579)Online publication date: 28-Oct-2022
This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the k-unit setting, where a monopolist seller has k copies of an indivisible item and faces n unit-demand buyers (whose value distributions can be non-identical). Four basic mechanisms among others ...
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessarily identical) distributions. There are four widely used and widely studied ...
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: Selling a single item among a number of buyers whose values are drawn from known independent and regular distributions. There are four widely-used and widely-studied mechanisms in this literature: ...
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