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Trustworthy and Transparent Third-party Authority

Published: 15 October 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Recent advances in cryptographic approaches, such as Functional Encryption and Attribute-based Encryption and their variants, have shown significant promise for enabling public clouds to provide secure computation and storage services for users’ sensitive data. A crucial component of these approaches is a third-party authority (TPA) that must be trusted to set up public parameters, provide private key service, and so on. Components of deployed cryptographic mechanisms such as the certificate authorities (CAs), which are the TPAs of the underlying PKI for the SSL/TLS protocol, have faced several types of attacks (e.g., stealthy targeted and censorship attacks), and certificate mis-issuance problems. Such practical challenges indicate that the successful deployment of newer emerging cryptographic schemes will also significantly depend on the trustworthiness of the TPAs. Furthermore, recently proposed decentralized TPA approaches that lower the threshold on the conditions required for an entity to become an authority can make the trust issue much worse. To address this issue, we propose an authority transparency framework to ensure the trustworthiness of TPAs of recent and emerging advanced cryptographic schemes. The framework includes a formal model and a secure logging-based approach to implement the framework. Further, to address the issues related to privacy, we also present a privacy-preserving authority transparency approach. We present security analysis and performance evaluation to show that authority transparency achieves the security and performance goals.

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology  Volume 20, Issue 4
November 2020
391 pages
ISSN:1533-5399
EISSN:1557-6051
DOI:10.1145/3427795
  • Editor:
  • Ling Liu
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 15 October 2020
Online AM: 07 May 2020
Accepted: 01 March 2020
Revised: 01 January 2020
Received: 01 April 2019
Published in TOIT Volume 20, Issue 4

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Author Tags

  1. Transparency
  2. access control
  3. audit
  4. secure computation
  5. trusted authority

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  • (2023)Enabling Efficient Deduplication and Secure Decentralized Public Auditing for Cloud Storage: A Redactable Blockchain ApproachACM Transactions on Management Information Systems10.1145/357855514:3(1-35)Online publication date: 23-Jun-2023
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