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Enabling Privacy-Aware Zone Exchanges Among Authoritative and Recursive DNS Servers

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Published:27 July 2020Publication History

ABSTRACT

We propose a privacy-aware schema that enables Authoritative DNS Servers to distribute their zones to third parties, e.g. Recursive DNS Servers or scrubbing services, without disclosing sensitive information. Therefore, DNS attack mitigation may be effectively accomplished at external vantage points, presumably closer to the attack sources than the Authoritative DNS Server. Our schema leverages on the space, time and privacy-enhancing properties of Cuckoo Filters to map zone names in an efficient manner, while permitting rapid name updates for large zones. The feasibility of our approach is tested via experiments within our laboratory testbed for a variety of DNS zones. Our evaluation intends to assess the privacy-awareness of our schema and its responsiveness to zone name changes. We conclude that our approach enables mapping of large DNS zones, while preserving privacy.

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      ANRW '20: Proceedings of the Applied Networking Research Workshop
      July 2020
      77 pages
      ISBN:9781450380393
      DOI:10.1145/3404868

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      Publication History

      • Published: 27 July 2020

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