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ASHES'20: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security
ACM2020 Proceeding
Publisher:
  • Association for Computing Machinery
  • New York
  • NY
  • United States
Conference:
CCS '20: 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Virtual Event USA 13 November 2020
ISBN:
978-1-4503-8090-4
Published:
09 November 2020
Sponsors:
Next Conference
October 14 - 18, 2024
Salt Lake City , UT , USA
Bibliometrics
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Abstract

It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the Fourth Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security 2020 (ASHES 2020), a post-conference satellite workshop of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2020 (CCS 2020). For the first time, ASHES was held completely virtual.

ASHES deals with all aspects of hardware security, and welcomes any contributions to this area. Besides being a forum for mainstream hardware security research, its mission is to specifically foster new concepts, solutions, and methodological approaches, and to promote new application scenarios. This includes, for example, new attack vectors on secure hardware, the merger of nanotechnology and hardware security, novel designs and materials, lightweight security hardware, and physical unclonable functions (PUFs) on the methodological side, as well as the internet of things, automotive security, smart homes, supply chain security, pervasive and wearable computing on the applications side. ASHES thereby aims at giving researchers and practitioners a unique opportunity to share their perspectives with others on various emerging aspects of hardware security research.

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SESSION: Keynote Talks
keynote
The Pursuit of Happiness: Establishing Hardware Root-of-Trust for Cyber Security

Design, fabrication, assembly, test, and debug of integrated circuits and systems have become distributed across the globe, raising major concerns about their security and trustworthiness. Such systems are prevalent is many critical-mission ...

keynote
Formidable Challenges in Hardware Implementations of Fully Homomorphic Encryption Functions for Applications in Machine Learning

The concept of homomorphic encryption was introduced almost exactly same time as the first public-key cryptographic algorithm RSA, which was multiplicatively homomorphic. Encryption functions with additive and multiplicative homomorphisms allow us (at ...

SESSION: Session 1: PUFs and Beyond
research-article
SoK: Towards Secret-Free Security

Digital secret keys are indispensable in modern cryptography and computer security - but at the same time constitute a routinely exploited attack target in every hardware system that stores them. This discrepancy has created perpetual battle between key ...

research-article
Erasable PUFs: Formal Treatment and Generic Design

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have not only been suggested as new key storage mechanism, but --- in the form of so-called "Strong PUFs'' --- also as cryptographic primitives in advanced schemes, including key exchange, oblivious transfer, or ...

SESSION: Session 2: Side Channels: Attacks & Defences
research-article
Far Field EM Side-Channel Attack on AES Using Deep Learning

We present the first deep learning-based side-channel attack on AES-128 using far field electromagnetic emissions as a side channel. Our neural networks are trained on traces captured from five different Bluetooth devices at five different distances to ...

research-article
Public Access
Lightweight Implementation of the LowMC Block Cipher Protected Against Side-Channel Attacks

LowMC is a parameterizable block cipher developed for use in Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). In these applications, linear operations are much less expensive in terms of resource utilization compared to the non-...

research-article
Exploring Effect of Residual Electric Charges on Cryptographic Circuits

Building leakage models is important in designing countermeasures against side-channel attacks (SCAs), and Hamming-weight/distance (HW/HD) models are traditional leakage models. Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) attacks using a tiny EM probe are the most ...

SESSION: Session 3: Fault Attacks & Cryptographic Hardware Design
research-article
Differential Fault Analysis of NORX

In recent literature, there has been a particular interest in studying nonce-based Authenticated Encryption (AE) schemes in the light of fault-based attacks as they seem to present automatic protection against Differential Fault Attacks (DFA). In this ...

research-article
PRINCE under Differential Fault Attack: Now in 3D

Fault analysis is one of the most studied physical attacks primarily due to the inherent ease of implementation. This work investigates integral and differential fault analysis attacks on the well-known lightweight block-cipher PRINCE. The work begins ...

research-article
Building a Modern TRNG: An Entropy Source Interface for RISC-V

The currently proposed RISC-V True Random Number Generator (TRNG) architecture breaks with previous ISA TRNG practice by splitting the Entropy Source (ES) component away from cryptographic PRNGs into a separate interface, and in its use of polling. We ...

SESSION: Session 4: Hardware & System Security
research-article
SoK: Physical and Logic Testing Techniques for Hardware Trojan Detection

Hardware Trojans have emerged as great threat to the trustability of modern electronic systems. A deployed electronic system with one or more undetected Hardware Trojan-infected components can cause grave harm, ranging from personal information loss to ...

research-article
Public Access
SpectreRewind: Leaking Secrets to Past Instructions

Transient execution attacks use microarchitectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting footprints in the ...

research-article
Public Access
WaC: A New Doctrine for Hardware Security

In this paper, we promote the idea that recent woes in hardware security are not because of a lack of technical solutions but rather because market forces and incentives prevent those with the ability to fix problems from doing so. At the root of the ...

Contributors
  • Technical University of Berlin
  • University of Passau
  • Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
  1. Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security

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    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate6of20submissions,30%
    YearSubmittedAcceptedRate
    ASHES '1720630%
    Overall20630%