A Stackelberg Game-based Power Allocation Strategy for Multistatic Radar System in the presence of Multiple Jammers
Pages 205 - 209
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of power allocation for multistatic radar system in the presence of multiple jammers. The primary goal of each radar is to minimize its transmit power under a specified detection threshold, while the jammers aim to maximize the interference to the radars by estimating the power emitted by the radars. The conflict between the radars and the jammers is modeled as a Stackelberg game, in which the radar system is the leader and the jammers act as the followers. Then, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium (SNE) are proved by giving the analytical expression of SNE strategies of the jammers. Furthermore, an iterative power allocation algorithm that achieves the SNE is presented. Finally, simulation results verify the convergence and effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
References
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Skolnik, Merrill Ivan. 1980. Introduction to radar systems (Vol. 3). McGraw-hill.
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A. Deligiannis, G. Rossetti, A. Panoui, S. Lambotharan and J. A. Chambers. 2016. Power allocation game between a radar network and multiple jammers. 2016 IEEE Radar Conference (RadarConf), Philadelphia, PA, 1-5. https://doi.org/ 10.1109/RADAR.2016.7485077
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C. Shi, F. Wang, S. Salous and J. Zhou. 2019. A Robust Stackelberg Game-Based Power Allocation Scheme for Spectral Coexisting Multistatic Radar and Communication Systems. 2019 IEEE Radar Conference (RadarConf), Boston, MA, USA, 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1109/RADAR.2019.8835607
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B. He and H. Su. 2019. Joint Power Allocation and Beamforming between a Multistatic Radar and Jammer Based on Game Theory. 2019 IEEE 11th International Conference on Communication Software and Networks (ICCSN), Chongqing, China, 337-341. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCSN.2019.8905330
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A. Deligiannis, A. Panoui, S. Lambotharan and J. A. Chambers. 2017. Game-Theoretic Power Allocation and the Nash Equilibrium Analysis for a Multistatic MIMO Radar Network. J. IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 65, 24 (December 2017), 6397-6408. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSP.2017.2755591
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Dejun Yang, Jin Zhang, Xi Fang, A. Richa and Guoliang Xue. 2012. Optimal transmission power control in the presence of a smart jammer. 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Anaheim, CA, 5506-5511. https://doi.org/ 10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503997
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A. Deligiannis, S. Lambotharan and J. A. Chambers. 2016. Game theoretic analysis for MIMO radars with multiple targets. J. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems 52, 6 (December 2016), 2760-2774. https://doi.org/ 10.1109/TAES.2016.150699
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Published In
December 2020
266 pages
ISBN:9781450388559
DOI:10.1145/3446999
Copyright © 2020 ACM.
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Published: 09 April 2021
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- National Aerospace Science Foundation of China
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
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ICIT 2020
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