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Precise Command Injection Analysis in Android Applications

Published:24 July 2021Publication History

ABSTRACT

Android mobile applications are vulnerable to code injection attacks. We use taint analysis to approximate the parameters of a sensitive instruction that may originate from user input. We combine it with a string analysis based on automatons to over-approximate the values of the string variables in the program. Using information derived from these two analyses, we detect when untrusted input may be used to inject malicious code into the program, and when the attack patterns were removed using a sanitizer operation. The proposed approach was implemented on top of FlowDroid. Experimental results show that the resulting analyzer, , is very efficient at detecting command injection vulnerabilities.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Other conferences
    ICMSS 2021: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Management Engineering, Software Engineering and Service Sciences
    January 2021
    180 pages
    ISBN:9781450389709
    DOI:10.1145/3459012

    Copyright © 2021 ACM

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 24 July 2021

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