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The risks of election believability (or lack thereof)

Published: 24 May 2021 Publication History

Abstract

With 90% of the 2020 U.S. general election ballot contents verifiable by paper, why do only 65% of voters trust the results?

References

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Bellovin, S.M. and Neumann, P.G. The big picture: A systems-oriented view of trustworthiness. Commun. ACM 61, 11 (Nov. 2018); https://bit.ly/3mYVpOR
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Blaze, M. et al. Voting Machine Hacking Village Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities in U.S. Election Equipment, Databases, and Infrastructure, (Sept. 2017); https://bit.ly/3suT6UH
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Chaum, D. Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Security & Privacy, (Jan. 2004); https://bit.ly/3eh7nzm
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Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council and The Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees (Nov. 12, 2020); https://bit.ly/3v3I9Lo
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Markettos, A.T. et al. Thunderclap: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Operating-System (IOMMU) Protection via DMA from Untrustworthy Peripherals, Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. NDSS 2019 (Feb. 24--27, 2019).
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Monmouth University Poll. More Americans happy about Trump loss than Biden win. Press Release (Nov. 18, 2020); https://bit.ly/3swuuej
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Rein, L. The IEEE P1583 Voting Machine Standard. IEEE Internet Computing 8, 1 (Jan.--Feb. 2004); https://bit.ly/3edEwM9
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Risk-Limiting Audits Working Group, Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits: Why and How (Oct. 2012); https://bit.ly/3sr0qRe
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Weber, S.N. California Secretary of State, Voting Technologies In Use By County, as of 15 October 2020; https://bit.ly/32tPfg0

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Published In

cover image Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM  Volume 64, Issue 6
June 2021
106 pages
ISSN:0001-0782
EISSN:1557-7317
DOI:10.1145/3467845
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 24 May 2021
Published in CACM Volume 64, Issue 6

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