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Economies with complex property rights: the role of exclusion

Published:16 July 2021Publication History
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Abstract

We discuss the exclusion core, a solution concept for object-allocation and object-exchange problems. The exclusion core is based on the right of exclusion and is especially useful for the analysis of economies with complicated property arrangements, such as those with shared ownership. The exclusion core coincides with the (strong) core in classic settings, and is closely related to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles algorithm.

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      cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges
      ACM SIGecom Exchanges  Volume 19, Issue 1
      June 2021
      54 pages
      EISSN:1551-9031
      DOI:10.1145/3476436
      Issue’s Table of Contents

      Copyright © 2021 Copyright is held by the owner/author(s)

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      • Published: 16 July 2021

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