Chungang Gao
ABSTRACT
Both moving target defense and cyber deception defense protect their systems and networks by increasing the uncertainty of information acquired by attackers. Moving target defense randomly changes the IP address, port, operating platform, and other information of the network system to invalidate the information obtained by the attacker within a period of time. Cyber deception defense misleads the attacker to attack the wrong target by setting up a scam in one's network information system. To compare the defense performance of moving target defense and cyber deception defense, this paper establishes a defense effectiveness evaluation model based on the Urn model and quantifies the defense performance of different defense methods based on parameters such as the number of detected addresses, network size, and address conversion frequency.
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