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A Study on the Effect of Credit Agreement Violation on the Independence of Board of Directors

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Published:02 December 2021Publication History

ABSTRACT

The number of listed companies that defaulted on their bonds rose rapidly in recent years. Under the background of the sharp increase of bond defaults in China, this paper wants to study the influence of bond defaults on the independence of the board. The empirical results show that the relationship between the bond default events and the number of independent directors is significantly positive. This means that bond default will increase the number of independent directors in the board. The increasing number of new independent directors can improve the quality of the listed company's financial report, can optimize the governance structure and protect the company shareholders’ rights and interests.

References

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  • Published in

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    ICEME '21: Proceedings of the 2021 12th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics
    July 2021
    882 pages
    ISBN:9781450390064
    DOI:10.1145/3481127

    Copyright © 2021 ACM

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 2 December 2021

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