Anhua Yang
ABSTRACT
The reform of the remuneration system is an important part of the reform of Chinese SOEs. We take the state-owned listed companies on the A-share main board of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2018 as a sample, and find that the compensation contracts of state-owned listed companies are effective. Specifically, the sensitivity of the executive pay-performance of central SOEs is higher than local SOEs, and central SOEs are more likely than local SOEs to have a close positive correlation between equity concentration and the sensitivity of executive pay-performance. In short, our study provides new ideas for improving the compensation system of Chinese SOEs, promotes the differentiated reform of the ownership structure of SOEs at all levels in the future.
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