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Can executive pay gap promote innovation efficiency: Evidence from China

Published: 02 December 2021 Publication History

Abstract

How to design the executive compensation gap and maximize pay efficiency has always been a problem in corporate governance. Therefore, this paper explores the correlation between the executive compensation gap and enterprise innovation efficiency. This paper uses listed companies in China's manufacturing and information technology industries from 2014 to 2019 as samples. The regression result shows that there is an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the executive compensation gap and enterprise innovation efficiency. This relationship means that the reasonable salary gap among executives could increase corporate innovation efficiency, but too large or narrow executive compensation gap would decrease innovation efficiency.

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  • (2022)The influence of returnee technology executives on enterprise innovation: the innovation patent data of global exchange market listed companiesEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja10.1080/1331677X.2022.208660036:1(1361-1376)Online publication date: 20-Jun-2022

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      cover image ACM Other conferences
      IMMS '21: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Management and Management Science
      August 2021
      332 pages
      ISBN:9781450384278
      DOI:10.1145/3485190
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      Published: 02 December 2021

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      1. Executive
      2. compensation gap
      3. innovation efficiency

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      • (2022)The influence of returnee technology executives on enterprise innovation: the innovation patent data of global exchange market listed companiesEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja10.1080/1331677X.2022.208660036:1(1361-1376)Online publication date: 20-Jun-2022

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